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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2008 congressional election in Virginia's Fifth District was one of the
biggest upsets to occur during the election. The incumbent, Virgil Goode, had been
the representative for the Fifth District since 1996, and had been in the state Senate
before that. Congressman Goode was heavily entrenched, well liked, and well
known. Essentially, he had no reason to believe that he would not win reelection.
Tom Perriello, on the other hand, was young and relatively unknown in the district.
He ran an uphill campaign that most pundits believed would fail. Despite this,
Perriello was able to win the 2008 election and unseat one of the most well
established congressmen in the state of Virginia. My research seeks to understand
how this happened.
The track record for House incumbents and Representative Goode would
suggest that the odds were in his favor and that Perriello should have lost, but he did
not. The majority of research and literature that currently exists on this subject helps
to highlight the reason that this issue is so interesting. Incumbency advantage has
been one of the most decisive factors in House elections since World War II. Almost
all of the literature agrees that incumbents have major advantages over challengers,
especially in House elections. Perriello was running in a conservative district that
tends to favor Republicans over Democrats. This can be seen in many of the articles
that covered the race. The great majority of those that highlighted the Perriello
campaign claimed that Goode had a lead during the entire election. This should come
as no surprise considering that until the day of the election, it appeared that Goode
was ahead by several points and had a steep advantage over Perriello. Finally,
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Perriello was running in an incredibly rural and expansive district that makes
campaigning, especially for challengers, exceptionally difficult.
Considering all of these factors, it is remarkable that Perriello was able unseat
Goode. How did Tom Perriello defeat Virgil Goode in this election? While it is clear
that many different factors contributed to Perriello's win, my research contends that
his ability to create an effective grassroots organization played an important role in
his success. This thesis will be explored in this paper.
This research project is significant for several reasons. First, there has been
very little research done on Perriello's victory. This is surprising because it seems
that political scientists could learn many lessons by studying this election. This
election was unique for several reasons and a comprehensive review of the election
will greatly aid the political science community in understating challenger victories.
Second, the scholarly literature seems to ignore challenger success in congressional
elections. Political scientists have spent most of their time focusing on House
incumbents and their campai gns. Thus, it is clear that a greater understanding of
challengers is needed. Third, this research will aid in the understanding of grassroots
movements in House elections. This research will increase the understating of how
grassroots

movements can aid congressional campaigns, especially in rural areas.

The main focus of this project is a qualitative case study of the 2008
congressional election in Virginia's Fifth District. This paper will consist of several
major components. The first will be a review and analysis of the scholarly literature.
These sources will be used to give background information about con gressional
incumbents and congressional elections. This literature review will be accompanied
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by an examination of information collected from different media outlets that reported
on the election. These sources will include newspaper articles and editorials. Other
information, such as polling data and campai gn materials, will also be used in this
project. Finally, a significant portion of this paper will use data gathered from
direction observations of the election.
In the next section, a literature review is presented. After this, a brief history
of the campaign is presented, which highlights key factors in Perriello's success.
Next, there will be a methodology section that examines the techniques of this
research and provides for some definitions. Following the methodology section, there
will be a case study of the campaign that will state the main arguments to support this
research's thesis and include more data to help reinforce the claims being made.
Specifically, I will explore the grassroots aspects of Perriello's campaign. Finally, I
will summarize my findings and suggest areas for future research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There has been a copious amount of research done on congressional
campaigns as well as on the issues of incumbent strength and challenger weakness.
Almost all scholars agree that House incumbents are some of the most entrenched and
most successful candidates in the American political system. Meanwhile, the
opposite can be said for the challengers who face them. While there is not nearly as
much information on the many weaknesses that challengers face, the literature is clear
that challengers are generally the losers in congressional contests. After an extensive
review of the literature, it is also clear that there is a limited amount of research that
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has been conducted on the subject of how challengers are able to beat incumbents. In
general, political scientists focus mostly on open-seat elections and incumbents and
there remains a significant hole pertaining to data on successful challengers. In the
following pages, I divide this literature review into three sections to explore how
scholars explain this subject. A fourth section follows that elaborates on the current
literature that surrounds the Perriello campaign.
A. Institutional Factors

The literature that covers this subject makes it clear that incumbents have
numerous advantages that allow them to devastate the majority of challengers that
face them. One benefit that many scholars cite is the redistricting process. In most
states, redistricting is done every ten years by the state government. If an
incumbent's political party is in power within the state government, then that
incumbent will often gain a new gerrymandered district that will increase his or her
chances of winning reelection. This is done by redrawing the lines of districts in
order to be more favorable to that party's candidates. This is a process that can be
done legally and is commonly done by both Democrats and Republicans. Steven Hill
(2003) is one scholar who clearly details the strengths that redistricting gives to
incumbents. Hill describes redistricting as "a glorified incumbent protection racket
that has robbed most voters of any semblance of choice or a competitive election"
(2003: 320). Hill goes on to explain that gerrymandering has made elections so
predictable that the Center for Voting and Democracy, which makes predictions on
elections based solely on the demographics in a district, has been able to make
congressional election predictions that ''were 100 percent accurate for the 2002
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elections and 99 .8 percent accurate for the previous three election cycles" (2003:
321). Hill explains that redistricting allows incumbents to have a secure district,
garner more election money, silence political debate and do all of this with very little
to no notice of the public because of the minuscule focus that is put on state
legislators and their role in redistricting.
Dan Gilgoff (2006) also cites gerrymandering as a tool that incumbents use to
help entrench themselves into congressional districts. Gilgoff argues that the
introduction of redistricting software during the early 1990s has caused a massive
decrease in the number of competitive House races and that "after the post-2000
redistricting, the number of competitive House races tumbled from 53 to 38" (2006:
3). This software helps incumbents by allowing them to see voter preferences and
history, house by house. It thus allows their party to more easily redraw their district
to favor them. Even Paul Herrnson (2000) explains the significances that redistricting
can have on an incumbent's chances of winning reelection. Herrnson explains that
"some districts are so dominated by one party that few individuals of the other party
are willing to commit their time, energy, or money to running for office" (2000: 24).
John Moore (2003) asserts that "some political scientists believe that
redistricting is the single most important factor determining partisan control of the
House" (2003: 400). Rhodes Cook (2000) also acknowledges the power
gerrymandering gives to incumbents. He claims that "incumbent reelection rates
have been high since World War II, in part because a proincumbent spin in much of
the line drawing diminishes the prospects for dramatic change in the House's
membership" (2000: 99). Finally, Samuel Issacharoff and Jonathan Nagler (2007)
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both argue that gerrymandering has contributed to insulated incumbents, a decrease in
contested elections and what they call an insulated Congress, or a Congress that
"becomes increasingly inattentive to the preference of the electorate" (2007: 1135).
B. Media Factors

Another advantage that incumbents have over challengers is that they
typically retain certain benefits from the media than do their challengers. The current
literature makes it clear media endorsements, biases, and access tend to favor
incumbent candidates. This only adds to the many disadvantages that that challengers
face. Mark Harmon (2007) makes this point immensely clear in a study he did that
reviewed the endorsements that papers have given incumbents. Harmon found that
"the most striking finding is how consistently newspapers prefer incumbents to
challengers. In 2002, this occurred at a ratio of about four-to-one. It ballooned to
about six-to-one in 2004 but fell back to a rough four-to-one ratio in 2006" (2007:
71). Harmon also found that the endorsements had "a tendency to prefer
congressional candidates slightly more conservative than congressional averages"
(2007: 73 ). Paul Herrnson argues similarly and even claims that media endorsements
tend to favor incumbents by a margin of 6 to I (2000: 219).
The bias and endorsements that candidates receive are not the only media
benefits that they have. Many scholars, including Rhodes Cook (2000), go on to say
that incumbents also benefit from higher media visibility as a result of "easy and
regular access to the media" (2000: 62). Incumbents simply have more media access
because they are already in Congress. They are not viewed as a candidate but as a
representative in the area; and as a result, they have more media access both during
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the campaign season and during the rest of their term. The ability for incumbents to
have greater media access is greatly influenced by their ability to have much greater
name recognition, which is expanded on in the next section.
C. The Incumbency Advantage
Incumbents have several benefits that stem from the representative natwe of
their job, which include higher name recognition and approval ratings, among other
things. Charles Finocchiaro (2003) points out that name recognition often leads to
greater approval ratings for the individual incumbent but "the influence of
congressional approval, while potentially important, is modest" (2003: 64). Janet
Box-Steffensmeier, David Kimball, Scott Meinke, and Katherine Tate (2003) all
argue that "through name recognition, constituent evaluations, and vote choice...
incumbent members of Congress reap electoral benefits from several aspects of the
representational relationship" (2003: 267). Edward Lascher's (2005) study makes the
argument that "greater average constituency size is consistently associated with better
results for incumbents" (2005: 276).
Jeffery Mondark (1995), moreover, puts forth the argument that greater name
recognition and higher approval ratings of incumbents translate into the fact that
"incumbents are not ousted randomly, but rather as a function of their competence
and integrity" (1995: 1066). Many incumbents are only unseated if they are involved
with a well-known scandal. While some scholars and political scientist might
disagree with Mondark's conclusions, most agree with the fact that greater name
recognition and approval ratings are experienced by incumbents compared to their
challengers.
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Incumbents also have a major advantage in raising funds for their campaigns.
An article by Seth Linden (2005) explains a great deal about incumbent campaign
funding. In his article, Linden explains that incumbents feel pressure to raise massive
funds even when there is little or no competition. These funds help to deter more
wealthy challengers, allow incumbents to donate to their parties, influence
constituents, and, of course, fund their campaign. Linden also makes it clear that the
more entrenched an incumbent is the more easily he can raise funds. Furthermore,
Herrnson (2000) stresses the advantages that incumbents have in raising funds.
Herrnson points out that incumbents begin to raise money earlier, get more money
from political action committees (PACs) and individuals, and in general are able to
raise "more money than challengers because they tend to be more visible, popular,
and willing to exploit the advantages of office holding" (2000: 154).
Rhodes Cook (2000) also emphasizes many of these points and goes on to
argue that "PACs have been overwhelmingly oriented toward incumbents" (2000:
56). He also points out that "fifty-seven percent of all individual contributions went
to incumbents. The percentage was much higher for PAC contributions - nearly 77
percent went to incumbents" (2000: 62). John Moore (2003) points out that "PACs
give overwhelmingly to incumbents because they are in a position to support PAC
interests when legislation is drafted as well when it come to a vote" (2003: 317).
From an organizational perspective, Paul Abramson, John Aldrich, and David Rohde
(2002) argue that "incumbents usually raise and spend more campaign funds than
challengers, and they usually have a better developed and more experienced
campaign organization" (2002: 211).
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Finally, Richard Born (1991) explains that Senate incumbents also have
increased chances to win elections, though they are not as secure in office as
members of the House. Basically, the literature is clear that while other incumbents
surely have an advantage over their challengers, it is truly only House incumbents
that are the most entrenched and who have the most benefits come election season.
D. Tom Perriello's Campaign
During Tom Perriello's campaign, there was a plethora of media coverage.
Most of the articles that came out had the same theme. Essentially, every news
source from CQ Today to the Martinsville Bulletin was saying the same thing: that
during the campaign, Tom Perriello's odds were looking better but the entire time it
appeared as if the election would favor Virgil Goode. After the election the media
reported, in an astonished way, that Perriello somehow managed to win the election
by a small margin. Funding was another central focus of many news articles. While
the media was primarily focused on polling data and who had raised the most money,
some articles did contain information about how the candidates were running their
campaigns.
Many articles focused on Tom Perriello's volunteer tithing initiative (Chris
Cillizza 2008, Sarah Arkin 2008, Gail Chaddock 2008). This initiative focused ten
percent of the volunteer hours worked on the campaign on community service
projects, including everything from Habitat for Humanity to soup kitchens across the
district. This initiative was meant to show Perriello's focus on giving back to the
community. Some media sources reported that it was very helpful to the success of
his campaign. Beyond that, Perriello also felt that the tithing initiative was in line
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with his faith. This initiative may have not generated a lot of votes or funds for
Perriello's campaign, but it certainty contributed to his ability to get the media to
focus more heavily on him, something many challengers have a difficult time doing.
Other articles were more concerned with Perriello' s ability to utilize the
internet as means of amassing more support and more funds. While these articles
also claimed that Goode was making efforts to utilize the internet as a campaign
resource, it was clear that they felt Perriello put more effort and showed more skill in
using the internet as a means to help his campai gn. These articles explained that
Perriello used Facebook, Myspace, YouTube, Twitter, ActBlue, and other internet
resources much more effectively than Goode. These resources are what gained
Perriello the title of a "netroots social entrepreneur" and many articles claimed that it
was his ability to use these resources that allowed him to gamer so much campaign
funding (Chaddock 2008: 1).
Some authors also focused on Perriello's grassroots mobilization efforts. For
instance, an article in CQ Today cited Perriello saying that "his campaign is striving
to 'do things a little differently"' (Giroux 2008: 1). Many articles argued that it was
clear from the onset of his campaign that Perriello was going to have a greater focus
on the people of this district opposed to just running a typical campaign . Perriello
opened many regional offices in an attempt to make sure that more individuals in the
district were able to be reached by his campaign.
Eventually, Perriello was able to have numerous volunteers from different
backgrounds volunteering for his campai gn. Highlighting this trend, many articles
focused on Perriello's ability to organize the African-American community in the
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Fifth District. Other stories also highlighted the higher nwnber of voters that had
been registered during this campaign and attributed a portion of this to the Perriello
campaign .
Many articles gave Perriello the title of "community organizer" as a way to
emphasis his heavy focus on grassroots mobilization. Almost all of the articles that
focused on this subject described Perriello's campaign as working directly in
communities, developing more than superficial relationships with individuals,
generating a renewed excitement about political involvement and civic duty, and
genuinely finding what the constituents of the Fifth District really wanted (Perriello
2009).
While the focus of most articles varied, there was a similar theme in almost all
of them. That is, the coverage gave the impression that there were multiple factors
helping Perriello's campaign. As The Washington Post put it, "no single factor was
responsible" for Perriello's success (Shapira 2009: 1). The majority of media sources
argued that his campaign used many different resources and utilized different tactics
to achieve victory. These articles asserted that it was the combination of all of these
things that allowed him to win.

III. HISTORY
In this section of the paper, a short history of the campaign is provided. This
section specifically focuses on the development of the Goode and Perriello
campaigns, but it is not intended to cover all of the events in the campaign. Briefly, it
can be seen that Perriello started with minimal support and slowly grew to gain more
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backing from the constituents of the Fifth District. Polls that were taken during the
campaign provide for an understanding of how support for the candidates developed.
This section is broken down by months in order to explain the data from each of these
polls and what this data explains about the campaigns and their utilization of different
strategies.
A. July
Polls taken by the Benson Strategy Group in July of 2008 show Goode with a
25 point lead over Perriello (Pollster.com 2008). By July, the campaigns of both
candidates were already underway and efforts on both sides were ongoing to secure
favor in the district. Perriello had opened six offices across the district in an attempt
to have as many points of contact with the constituents of the district as possible. It
was in this month that the Perriello campaign announced record funding levels,
raising more than $300,000 in the second quarter, with 70% of that funding coming
from small donors (Martinsville Bulletin 2008). The Goode campaign also raised a
significant amount of money; during July, it was announced that the Goode campai gn
raised $390,575 (Martinsville Bulletin 2008).
At this point in the campaign, Perriello had already begun to devolve a strong
grassroots campaign. Goode had also been very busy working at several events
across the district and making other public appearances. By July, Goode's stances on
many issues, such as fighting illegal immigration, and his top priorities as a
Congressman were already well established (Collins 2008).
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B. August
The next major polls were taken in August by SurveyUSA; these polls show
that Goode had gained even more support, with a lead of 34 points (Pollster.com
2008). This was a particularly busy month for both campaigns. Both candidates, and
their staffers, attended many late summer festivals and events in hopes of gaining
more support. Perriello' s ability to be a serious competitor against Goode was
exemplified in August when the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
added his campaign to the Red to Blue program, which worked to aid Democratic
challengers in close elections ("Perriello Campaign Gets Boost" 2008).
During this month, a public forum in Charlottesville was held; and while both
sides seemed to claim their candidate as the "winner," it was clear that the district
remained split on many issues. This forum also highlighted Perriello' s strong
commitment to registering new voters and his attempts to increase voter turnout for
the election, causing even Goode to recognize Perriello as a difficult opponent who
"is working to get new people registered" (Rhew 2008: 1). During this month, the
major issues of the congressional election really began to surface, including drilling
offshore, veterans' rights, economic issues in the district, heath care, and other things
that concerned the citizens of the Fifth District.
C. September

September was a month that lacked any major polling data. In this month,
both campaigns began to take a more negative stance toward one another. The
Perriello campaign played up a Goode fundraising event held on September 11th that
was hosted by lobbyists Tom Lankford, Jan Schoonmaker, and the lobbying group
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Van Scoyoc Associates, Inc. PAC. The Perriello campaign also attacked Goode for
rejecting offers to have debates in Danville and Farmville. Meanwhile, the Goode
campaign attacked Perriello for not taking a stronger stance against illegal
immigration and being a supporter of certain government regulations. The Goode
campaign also released a very negative television advertisement that portrayed
Perriello as a Northerner and provided an image of Perriello that was doctored to
make him appear as a "dark figure." Congressman Goode's campaign continued to
focus on events being held around the district in order to reach out to voters, while the
Perriello campaign focused more on direct voter contact through extensive volunteer
efforts.
D. October
In early October, polling data from SurveyUSA showed that Goode had
slipped to a lead of only thirteen points (Pollster.com 2008). During October, both
campaigns remained negative toward one another as they stepped up their efforts at
voter outreach. The efforts made by the Perriello campaign over the summer to
increase support through extensive grassroots work began to pay off during October
as polling data showed Goode's lead slipping. Meanwhile, Goode's campaign
worked to energize his Republican base and garner more support from independents.
Polls taken by the Benson Strategy Group later in October showed Geode's lead drop
from thirteen points to eight points (Pollster.com 2008).
Part of Perriello's success may also be attributed to his efforts at donating
campaign time to work on community service. By October, Perriello's campaign
announced that it had recorded over 1,000 hours of community service; these hours
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helped Perriello to develop the kind of support needed for a robust grassroots
movement (Graff2008). Goode's campaign manager also highlighted how Goode
focused on community service efforts by donating money instead of time (McNeill
2008). Data from polls in late October taken by SurveyUSA illustrated that Goode
had lost another large chunk of support putting Goode at only a three point lead over
Perriello (Pollster.com 2008). Despite Goode's increased efforts to run an aggressive
campaign, October proved to be a month where Perriello clearly began to close the
gap.

E. November

On November 4, 2008, the election was held; but the results that followed
were inconclusive. While media sources started reporting very speculative election
results, it was clear from the vote tallies that no apparent winner had emerged. In the
days that followed, the media and both campaigns waited to hear the official election
results. Perriello was confident that he had taken the Fifth District and on November

i11 he declared victory, though the results were still unclear.

By November 24th, "the

State Board of Elections certified Perriello as winner of the 5th District race" and on
that same day Goode announced his request for a recount of the election results
(Barto 2008). After the recount was conducted, the Virginia State Board of Elections
declared Tom Perriello the winner of the election, winning by only 727 votes
(Virginia State Board of Elections n.d.).
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In the following pages, this paper works to explain how Perriello was able to
achieve this victory. While many variables are relevant, this study argues that his
grassroots mobilization efforts were essential.

IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Research Methods

This research utilizes a direct observation model of data collection.
Specifically, I directly observed the Perriello campaign and the information presented
in the following section largely comes from my observations. In 2008, I worked with
the Perriello campaign as a campaign assistant. While working on the Perriello
campaign, I kept a daily journal of the activities that the Farmville office carried out.
My experiences with the campaign allows for data analysis that is based on an
immediate examination of the campaign and its activities. To provide more
information and to back up the findings of this direct observation model, other types
of sources are utilized, such as newspaper articles, campaign funding data, voter data,
and other scholarly sources. Most of these materials come from sources within the
Fifth District and were written during the time of the campai gn.
B. The Meaning of Grassroots Mobilization

Grassroots is a term too often used without an established definition being
present. It generically refers to political movements that come from everyday people
instead of from political elites or other forms of political leadership. In order to
understand how grassroots mobilization was imperative to Perriello's success, a clear
and much more detailed definition of a grassroots movement must be established.
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Generally, a grassroots movement is one that develops organically and in the lowest
levels of political leadership. Unlike other political movements, a grassroots
movement comes out of a community and is run and led by that community rather
than by many of the traditional elites that direct political activities.
Political campaigns that utilize grassroots mobilization are very different from
typical political campaigns. Campaigns relying on grassroots mobilization generally
focus heavily on direct voter contact and have extensive volunteer networks that
develop from the communities in which a candidate is running. Rather than receiving
large amounts of support from national political parties, interest groups, political
consultants, political action committees, or other traditional areas of candidate
support, these kinds of campaigns focus on support from voters. Grassroots
campaigns use most of their resources to run voter registration drives, direct voter
contact efforts, and get out the vote drives. These campaigns spend most of their time
on door-to-door canvassing, phone banking, attending events, and being involved
with other community events. Funds for these kinds of campaigns primarily come
from voters rather than national parties or other groups. This also means that
fundraising efforts focus on the voters and their communities rather than on
businesses or other groups that traditionally give funds to campaigns.
The individuals who work on grassroots campaigns are normally not
campaign professionals and are generally not paid. These volunteers work for the
candidate solely because of the excitement that exists for the candidate and his or her
ideas. This means that grassroots campaigns often lack much of the professional
campai gn support that is seen in many successful congressional campaigns. In
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general, grassroots campaigns exhibit more direct voter involvement in their
campaigns than do traditional political campaign.

V. CASE STUDY
A. Campaign Activities
Torn Perriello's 2008 congressional campai gn highlights many of the
differences that exist between a grassroots campaign and a typical campaign. This
can be seen in the activities that were conducted by his campaign and how they aided
his development of a powerful grassroots organization. This grassroots organization
helped propel Perriello forward and helped him to eventually win an election against
a well-entrenched incumbent. Activities that were essential to the success of the
campaign include direct voter contact, use of nontraditional media, a progressive
tithing initiative, community organizing, and other grassroots tactics.
Direct voter contact is essential to any congressional campai gn but it takes on
a much higher priority and much more essential role in grassroots campaigns. While
many traditional campaigns focus on direct voter contact as a way to tell the public
about their candidate, Perriello's campaign used this tactic as a way to build
relationships and engage people from diverse backgrounds to come together and act
on their values. It was not simply communicating; it was organizing communities to
act in their best interests and to support candidates and causes that would work to
improve their lives. The traditional ways of contacting voters and engaging them to
be more involved were used, such as door-to-door canvassing, phone banking,
attending community events, aiding voter registration drives, and launching get out
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the vote campaigns. But Perriello's campaign went far beyond these traditional
tactics and utilized many different activities that allowed voters to be a part of his
campaign and influence his decisions. These tactics are what made the difference for
Perriello and allowed him to develop a large grassroots network that helped him to
win the election.
Perriello's campaign did not simply rely on traditional media sources; and
while radio, newspapers, and television were used, his campaign also utilized a great
deal of nontraditional communication tactics. Specifically, his campaign was able to
organize and spread on the internet. It was this ability to effectively integrate the web
into his regular campaign activities that earned Perriello the title of a "netroots 'social
entrepreneur"' (Chaddock 2008: 1). Through websites and networking tools such as
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, ActBlue, and countless biogs, a different type of
grassroots was tapped into. The internet has greatly expanded people's access to
information, and Perriello used it to allow voters to have greater access to politics.
This focus on using the internet as a tool to facilitate the development of his
campaign allowed voters and constituents to play a greater role in Perriello's election
fight. Many of the activities that are normally conducted during a grassroots
campaign can be conducted or enhanced by using the internet. Voters were able to
provide greater feedback and influence Perriello's campaign message; but beyond
that they were also able to organize groups in support of Perriello and use websites to
donate money. This kind of organizing allows voters to combat many of the
traditional influences over candidates and take back much of the democratic power to
which they are entitled. Many citizens of the Fifth District had felt marginalized by
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politics and the internet gave these people a way to be influential and be involved.
Essentially, the internet was used as a tool that lowered the barrier for the people of
the Fifth District to be more involved in the election. In a newspaper interview
during the campaign, Perriello said that it is essential "for everyone to get involved in
politics and have their voices heard" ("Perriello Says His Campai gn Aims to 'Break
Down the Barriers"' 2008).
The effectiveness of the utilization of the internet allowed the campaign to
turn voters who had traditionally used blogs or other internet resources into activists
who were volunteering to organize their communities. The increased connection
between the voters and how the campaign was conducted illuminates how the
campaign was able to utilize an expansive grassroots organization that aided
Perriello's victory. How the campaign conducted its online activities increased
people's connections to politics and allowed them to be more involved and
influential.
The campaign also utilized many other grassroots activities. For example,
voters were encouraged to write letters to the media both about Perriello and about
many of the issues that they felt strongly about. This allowed voters to not only steer
the direction of the media but also allowed them to influence the focus of both
Perriello's and Geode's campaigns. This was accompanied by a large and ever
growing grassroots network that caused many letters to flood into the mailboxes of
local papers all over the district. While these letters' effectiveness is hard to measure,
it is clear from the letters to the editor sections in many local papers, that they had
some impact. This network and the tactics that Perriello' s campaign utilized was able
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to change a candidate who started with almost no name recognition into a candidate
capable of winning an election against an incumbent.
In addition to these efforts, Perriello developed a tithing initiative to help his
campaign. This idea is extraordinarily different from many of the traditional tactics
that have been used by campaigns. Basically, the tithing plan involved donating ten
percent of all of the volunteer hours worked on the campaign to be worked on
community service projects. The initiative included work at food banks, soup
kitchens, Habit for Humanity, and several other locations around the Fifth District.
With this initiative, the Perriello campaign was able to tithe 1,000 hours to
community service projects by October; and by the end of the election, the Perriello
campaign had tithed near 1,300 hours. Not only did the initiative demonstrate a
genuine focus on the communities in the Fifth District, but it also reminded everyone
working on the Perriello campaign that the center of attention of the campaign was
organizing people to act on their values and ideals. In a newspaper article, one citizen
of the district explained that the initiative "might symbolize the kind of representative
Perriello hopes to be - someone engaged in the community and willing to get their
[sic] hands dirty to help people" (McNeill 2008: 1). This enterprise was very
significant in Perriello's grassroots campaign because the volunteering allowed the
campaign to find more volunteers and spread the message of the campaign while also
helping the district and developing a network of people who were willing to work
hard for what they believed in. The tithing initiative allowed Perriello's campaign to
develop a larger network of grassroots activities and helped to create more
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momentum for his campai gn by generating a genuine positive image of both Perriello
and his campaign.
Beyond grassroots organizing for the campaign, Perriello also made sure that
his campaign was focused on community organizing and the development of power
structures that could be utilized by the people of the district. Perriello' s campaign
was focused on helping younger voters, minorities, and rural voters regain their voice
in the district. This caused political pundit Chris Cillizza to describe the campaign as
being extremely effective in "organizing the black community district-wide" (Cillizza
2008: 2). Grassroots organizing was certainly part of this but this extended beyond
the goals of getting Perriello elected. This gets to part of the Perriello campaign that
focused on the development of communities in order to work for the change, both
political and socially, that they needed. His campaign was not just focused on
grassroots organizing; it was also focused on forming associations of people that
would get the district as a whole more involved with politics.
The campaign 's attempts at community organizing were facilitated by several
programs. One of these was clearly the house parties that individuals held in the
district, where people would discuss the future of their communities as well as the
election. Perriello' s campaign helped to set up and run these house parties, but it was
the voters of the district that held and developed the parties themselves. Faith
organizing was also a major part of community organizing, and should come as no
surprise when one considers the large role that religion plays for many people of the
Fifth District. Churches are often the centers of community for many people and
Perriello' s campaign focused on these centers to aid in the development of stronger
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community organizations. Perriello's campaign attempted to go beyond increasing
turnout and identifying the political affiliations of voters; through community
organizing and faith outreach, the Perriello campaign made efforts to improve
communities around the Fifth.
Tom Perriello also played a vital role in many of these activities and his own
personality aided the development of a better grassroots campaign. Perriello worked
to not only attend events and appear on different media outlets, as most candidates do,
but to also make sure that he was a part of every activity that the campaign
conducted. Perriello phone banked, canvassed, tithed his time and did every other
activity that any of his campaign staff, interns, and volunteers did. This greatly
increased the amount of contact he had with the voters and made him more aware of
their issues; but more importantly, it allowed voters to have more contact with him. It
is essential for a grassroots campaign to have a candidate who is accessible to the
people working on the campaign and Perriello made sure to be present in many
communities that other candidates had often ignored. People were willing to organize
their communities and help the campaign because of Perriello's accessibility. He did
not seem like a political candidate as much as part of the community in which he was
running.
The development and use of the campaign's message reflects many of the
tendencies that can be seen in most grassroots organizing campai gns. Basically,
Perriello's message focused on the values of the voters and the specific issues that
were personal to them or that affected them and the people they knew. While many
campaigns develop a message and then tell voters what that message is, Perriello
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attempted to listen to voters and allowed them to develop a message that Perriello
would then support. His message was not being told to the voters; the voters were
telling Perriello what his message should be. One example of this occurred during
the campaign when Perriello began to focus on several local farmers' issues after
attending several farmers' markets across the district and hearing their concerns.
These issues included supporting the protection of unregulated direct farmer-to
consumer trade and supporting policy that favors small farmers over larger factory
farms. This would not have worked to the extent that it did if it were not for the fact
that Perriello was an exceedingly accessible candidate who spent much of his time
working with and listening to the communities that he wanted to represent. One news
article even quoted Perriello explaining that "if you're not in touch with the
community ... you're not in touch with what you need to be talking about in
Washington" ("Perriello Says His Campaign Aims to 'Break Down the Barriers'"
2008: 1 ). This accessibility was combined with a grassroots network that relayed a
large volume of feedback about issues to Perriello and allowed his campaign to let the
voters develop a political platform that they wanted, not the other way around.
B. Campaign Personnel
Another area that helps to highlight how Perriello's campaign effectively
utilized grassroots organizations can be seen in the staff that the campaign
maintained, as well as in the vast network of volunteers that developed as a result of
the grassroots networks that were formed across the district. Traditional campaigns
often rely on a medium-sized staff of professional campaigners, data analysts,
political consultants, and some volunteers. Perriello's campai gn did not rely on these
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traditional campaign workers and instead consisted of a small group of local
professional campaigners, a large group of interns involved in an intensive grassroots
based internship program, and most importantly an extensive network of volunteers.
What was significant about all of these campaign workers was that they did not know
much about working campaigns but instead knew a lot about the Fifth District.
Perriello' s campaign did consist of a small base of local professional
campaigners who were full time and paid. Unlike most campaigns, though, most of
these individuals did not have backgrounds in campaigns or politics. Instead, the
staff consisted of local people with diverse backgrounds who were passionate about
the values that Perriello stood for and were passionate about energizing their
communities to become more involved in politics. 1bis worked to Perriello' s
advantage during the campaign because many of these individuals already had
connections in the communities that they were helping to organize. This allowed
Perriello's campaign to have a focus on the voters in specific communities instead of
the traditional leaders that many campaigns go to. This staff had a greater knowledge
of the district and greater links to the people, too. 1bis made grassroots organizing
across the Fifth District more straightforward and effective.
Another part of Perriello' s staff consisted of approximately fifteen interns
from his Common Good Summer Campaign Fellowship. The program was designed
to provide college-aged individuals, from around the district, a crash course in
grassroots organizing. For the summer that the interns worked, they operated offices
and conducted much of the organizing that was essential to the success of the
campaign. Much like the paid staff these interns were primarily from around the
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district and were well connected with the area. The interns were the workforce that
allowed Perriello's campaign to open six offices across the district and have as much
face-to-face contact with voters as possible. These interns were coordinating most of
the campaign activities and helped to develop the grassroots network that sustained
the rest of the campaign. Many of the interns continued to work with the campaign
extensively after the fellowship ended.
The most important group, and the largest, of individuals that worked on the
Perriello campaign were volunteers. Volunteers had been essential to the Perriello
campaign since its beginning and they played the most essential role in grassroots
organizing. The actual people of the district organized their communities and broke
down many of the perceived barriers to participation in politics that had been keeping
so many from being active. The other workers of the campaign helped and they often
set the groundwork up, but it was the volunteers and others who were committed to
organizing their communities that developed the grassroots organization. Many of
the classic problems for a challenger in an incumbent involved election were
overcome because of these volunteers. Traditional issues, such as name recognition,
were overcome by neighbors speaking with each other about Perriello and these
conversations often turned into groups in support of the candidate. Other issues like
fundraising were overcome by a large community based organization of voters who
were all donating small amounts.
Volunteers in the Perriello campaign also perpetuated a cycle of getting and
training volunteers, vital to developing a strong grassroots network. When volunteers
started working with the campaign, they were trained how to do many of the basic
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tasks involved with campaigning. As these volunteers actually worked doing these
activities, they were able to then begin training other volunteers. Their own ties to
the communities that they worked in increased awareness about the campaign and
about the significance of volunteering and aiding in developing a grassroots network.
This allowed a few volunteers to turn into a large network of people working to help
in whatever way they could. The interns aided in recruiting the initial volunteers; but
once they were involved, the volunteers began running the campaign itself. Thus,
even after many of the interns stopped formally working on the campaign, there was a
volunteer network helping to develop it. It was this base hundreds of volunteers that
was consistently able to generate more volunteers, throughout the campaign, that
developed such a strong community based grassroots organization.
Often the small-town politics that is prevalent in so many of the Fifth
District's communities excludes some groups from participating. Volunteering to
help brings a community closer together and helps it challenge local party leaders and
town hall officials who have dominated and controlled much of the political
organization of these communities. Many examples of this were evident during the
campaign when people realized that they no longer needed to go through their local
Democratic parties, often parties that no longer functioned or worked to represent the
ideas of individuals in their area, in order to work for a Democratic candidate. People
were able to overcome much of the traditional political leadership by realizing the
strength that a better organized community gave them. Some communities that had
been divided by different leaders in those areas were able to rise above insignificant
disputes by coming together on issues that their communities needed to address. This
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was seen when communities went beyond the figures that had marked traditional
divisions in their communities in order to support Perriello, a particularly strong
example of this was seen in the African-American community in Prince Edward
County. The grassroots network that developed allowed these communities to lower
the barrier of political participation and to have a greater say about the politics of
their district but also their community.

C. Fundraising
Another area in which Perriello' s grassroots tactics can be easily seen is in
how his campaign conducted fundraising. Several things were unconventional about
the ways in which Perriello sought funds. His fundraising tactics were based in the
same kind of grassroots tactics that made other aspects of his campaign so successful.
The majority of the funds raised by Perriello's campaign came from individual
contributors. According to data from the Federal Election Commission, Perriello
received 85.13% of his total campaign receipts from individuals, while Goode only
received 69.03% from individuals (Federal Election Commission n.d.). Perriello's
campaign focused on receiving small contributions from many individuals, and this
was facilitated by an extensive grassroots network that his campaign worked to
develop. Goode also received greater amounts of funding from PACs, with 28.35%
of his total campaign receipts coming from PACs, while Perriello only received
10.89% from PACs (Federal Election Commission n.d.). This is even more
astonishing when accompanied with the fact that Perriello also raised more money
than Goode. Perriello's campaign raised a total of $1,866,782 and Goode's campaign
raised a total of $1,797,231 (Federal Election Commission n.d. ). Thus, not only did
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Perriello raise more funds than the incumbent candidate, but he also raised more of
those funds from individual contributors.
There was a great deal of media focus on this subject. From a review of many
newspaper articles, it appears clear that the majority of Perriello's donors were within
the Fifth District and donated less than $200. According to one article, as much as
70% of Perriello's donors contributed below that figure (Martinsville Bulletin 2008).
Tim Fernholz notes, futhermore, "small-donor contributions, combined with
Perriello's traditional fund-raising, a deep dedication to organizing, and several
powerful performances, were enough to topple Goode" (Fernholz 2009).
The key to Perriello's fundraising success was in his campaign's tactics for
raising funds. Specifically, his interns and volunteers focused exclusively on
obtaining money from individual contributors and were instructed to turn away any
money coming from corporations, PACs, lobbyists, or any other group. The funds
that these workers generated came from the immense grassroots network that those
workers helped to develop. Instead of relying on many of the traditional sources of
campai gn funding, Perriello again reached out to the communities of the district to aid
his campaign . Perriello's team also utilized many nontraditional means of acquiring
funds. For instance, his campaign used the internet to organize and generate
campaign contributions. Websites such as ActBlue aided the Perriello campaign to
raise funds from all over the district and focus specifically on the voters. The
campaign also relied on fundraising events, as do most campaigns, to raise many of
the funds for the campaign; but what made these events different was that they were
often organized by individuals of the district, not the campaign. These events were
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often successful because of the local support that generated them in the first place and
the grassroots network that Perriello's campaign set up helped to facilitate this. It
was Perriello' s campaign success at grassroots organizing that caused such great
success with fundraising.

VI. CONCLUSION
A. Summary and Analysis of Findings

The 2008 congressional election for the Fifth District of Virginia was unique
for many reasons. It is exceptional that a relatively unknown challenger was able to
take on an entrenched incumbent and succeed in defeating him, breaking the trend of
incumbent victory seen in almost all House of Representative elections. This
research demonstrates that the Perriello campaign's ability to create an effective
grassroots network was a significant factor in determining the outcome of the
election. Through a detailed examination of the activities, personnel, and fundraising
tactics that the Perriello campaign made use of, this research found that Perriello' s
victory was influenced by a successful grassroots campaign. This finding is
significant because it highlights a case where a challenger was able to overthrow an
incumbent without a major political scandal being involved.
Following the election, some reporters said that Barack Obama's campaign
helped Perriello. After understanding that John McCain, and not Obama, carried the
Fifth District in the presidential race, it becomes clear that this is not the case. The
Obama campaign was weakly established in the Fifth District and it was not until the
late months of the campaign that the Obama team even began to organize in the area.
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Furthermore, Obama's campaign workers lived in Perriello's offices, relied on data
from the Perriello campaign, utilized the grassroots networks that Perriello had
developed, and benefited from the momentum generated by Perriello' s campaign.
B. Suggested Areas for Future Research
Very little research has been completed on the subject of challengers facing
incumbents and even less research exploring the success of challengers. The current
consensus that incumbents generally win offers little on how challengers are able to
overcome incwnbents, unless a scandal is involved. While this research detailed one
campaign where a challenger was successful, it is clear that more research needs to be
done on this subject. More attention should focus on successful challengers and the
tactics that their campaigns employ. The Perriello campaign offers a very interesting
case study on this subject and it would be beneficial for more research to be done
specifically on that campaign. More polling data about voters in the Fifth District and
their opinions would be useful to further the research on this subject, and data from
those who worked on both campaigns would be especially useful. This research
primarily relied on a direct observation model of data collection and other forms of
data collection would add depth to our understanding of the Perriello campaign.
Another area that the literature offers very little information on is how
grassroots campaigns compare to more typical political campaigns. This paper was a
case study on the effects of a successful grassroots campaign in a rural House district
and thus its scope is limited. Other campaigns that attempted to run a grassroots style
campaign should be studied on all levels of the United States political scale. More
research on this type of campaign could be vital to understanding the impact that such
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a campaign has on the success of a candidate. Considering that Perriello was able to
overthrow an incumbent, it should be clear that this kind of campaign is effective and
it would be beneficial to see more research on this subject.
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